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1. Introduction
Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature (hereinafter referred to as TCI) in Logic and 
Conversation explains how a speaker can express additional meaning that is different from the 
compositional meaning of a sentence. This model requires the hearer to figure out the literal 
meaning first, and then infer the speaker’s meaning based on pragmatic factors such as context and 
intention.
However, it is difficult for TCI to explain the embedded structure. Pragmatic factors can intrude 
into the embedded components of sentences, thus producing what Simons (2017a) calls “embedded/
local pragmatic effects”1: at a certain stage of interpretation, the propositional content within the 
scope of linguistic operators contains the output content of pragmatic inference.
1. Simons (2017a) uses “embedded pragmatic effects” and “local pragmatic effects” alternately in the text. Although the emphasis is 
different, they are equivalent and interchangeable. It should be mentioned that Simons (2014: 22) called the added content “embedded 
implicature”, but it was questioned by reviewers. Therefore, Simons (2017a, b) uses the term embedded/local pragmatic effects. 
Carston (2017: 518) believes that the change in terminology used by Simons reflects her loyalty to Grice’s framework. Besides, 
Huang (2017: 657) calls this content “neo-Gricean, pre-semantic conversational implicature”
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(1) If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared, then Tom will be 
quite content.
Cohen (1971: 58) suggests that the sentence’s truth is compatible with the claim that Tom will 
not be quite content if a republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack. 
Thus, Cohen maintains that the meaning of and is not that of logical conjunction, and its meaning 
of expressing “temporal ordering” is deduced from the antecedent of (1), so TCI cannot be applied 
to the interpretation of conditional sentences. In addition, examples such as disjunctive sentences, 
comparative structures, and complement sentences of propositional attitude verbs also bother TCI 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Levinson, 2000; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2003).
Simons (2017a) thinks that TCI can explain embedded pragmatic effects only by making some 
modifications. Borg (2017), Recanati (2017), and Carston (2017) evaluate Simons’ arguments and 
raise their doubts respectively. Simons (2017b) responds to these challenges and further clarifies her 
stance. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 is a summary 
of Simons’ (2017a) contribution, and section 3 briefly combs the critical opinions from these 
scholars. Section 4 reflects on the essence and value of this debate and discusses its influence on the 
existing theories, aiming at accurately grasping the late progress of Grice’s theory of conversational 
implicature. Section 5 concludes.
2. Simons’ insight: Local pragmatics
Simons (2017a) holds that embedded pragmatic effects are the results of the global (speech 
level) pragmatic requirement and are the measures taken by acting locally to solve the potentially 
global pragmatic violation. The interpretation assumes that the hearer can identify the embedded 
part of the sentence. As long as this assumption is guaranteed, a modified TCI with more substantial 
explanatory power emerges.
Consider a framework for relevance implicature: the speaker says p; if the speaker says p 
and only means p, the speaker violates the maxim of relevance, then that the speaker says p is 
initially determined not to cooperate; however, there is no reason to believe that the speaker is 
uncooperative. Therefore, the speaker wants to express something that could be inferred from 
p, making conversational contribution relevant in the present. Based on further deduction, it is 
concluded that the speaker means q instead of p, or means q in addition to p. 
This reasoning process can be divided into two parts: 1) Gricean reasoning, i.e., to identify a 
blatant violation of the principle of cooperation, and to conceive the conclusion that the speaker 
does not mean the (literal) meaning of the sentence (but other meanings) as Grice’s conclusion; 2) 
interpretative step, i.e., starting from Grice’s conclusion, the hearer continues to infer and find the 
best explanation to answer the question of what meaning the speaker is most likely to express.
It should be noted that this is the reasoning process for simple sentences (excluding embedded 
structures). Simons believes that this process can also explain pragmatic effects embedded in 
clauses, which is driven by the requirement of making the speech as a whole cooperative (Simons, 
2017a: 472–473).
(2) A: What will you do for your mother’s birthday?
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B: Either I’ll buy flowers or I’ll cook a nice dinner.
Speaker A asks a question and speaker B replies with a disjunctive sentence. At the same time, 
any part of the disjunctive sentence is not the answer to the question under the complete literal 
interpretation. The hearer may naturally enrich and interpret this disjunctive sentence, i.e., buy 
flowers and give them to her mother or cook for her mother to eat. In this way, embedded pragmatic 
effects surface.
Assuming that the first part of the disjunctive sentence does not appear in the embedded clause 
but in a simple sentence, then the enrichment of the simple sentence is the same as that of the 
disjunctive sentence. The enrichment of the simple sentence can be interpreted by the traditionally 
conceived TCI. Speaker A asks a question, and assumes that speaker B is cooperative and rational. 
Then, speaker A hopes that B’s answer is the answer to the question. Therefore, B’s saying “buy 
flowers” actually wants A to speculate that B’s meaning is to buy flowers and give them to his 
mother. Let us turn to the answer embedded in the clause. First of all, A judges that the whole 
content of the disjunctive sentence is compositional; second, A realize that the first part of the 
disjunctive sentence is not the answer to the question, because buying flowers is not the way to 
celebrate a birthday, and only those who buy flowers and give them to specific people are; then, 
the disjunctive sentence as a whole does not answer the question. However, there is no reason to 
think that the disjunctive sentence uttered by B is not cooperative, so the first part of the disjunctive 
sentence is not what B means. Based on this, with relevant contextual conditions, A deduces what 
the first part of B’s disjunctive sentence really means2.
The focus of this analysis is that the reasoning process of the disjunctive sentence is the same as 
that of the simple sentence. The difference lies in that the former is used to determine the content 
of the disjunctive sentence, and the result is embedded pragmatic effects. The inference of the 
embedded clause is triggered by the fact that the disjunctive sentence as a whole fails to meet the 
maxim of relevance, specifically, it fails to be relevant to the question raised (Simons, 2017a: 474–
478). In short, through a rational reconstruction of Grice’s reasoning, the hearer obtains intuitive 
and correct interpretation based on the compositional meaning of words with syntactic rules, which 
requires pragmatic enrichment of embedded clauses. However, the trouble with this interpretation 
is that if the intuitively correct interpretation is regarded as what is said, then the concept of what 
is said will be complicated and full of contradictions3. Therefore, Simons introduces another 
interpretation, taking the disjunctive sentence just mentioned as an example.
(3) A: What will you do for your mother’s birthday?
B: Either I’ll buy flowers or I’ll cook a nice dinner.
Suppose we want to avoid the interpretation of embedded pragmatic effects that contribute to the 
truth-condition. In that case, the hearer can regard the intuitively correct interpretation as the result 
of global pragmatic inference, i.e., B says he wants to buy flowers or cook (absolutely/completely), 
and implies that B wants to buy flowers and give them to mother or cook for his mother. This is 
the same as the reasoning process for the disjunctive sentence above. At the same time, the only 
2. Simons (2017a) does not mention whether the second part of the disjunctive sentence can play the same role. Carston (2017: 523) 
thinks that this is not a problem, and the same reasoning process can solve this problem.
3. At this point, pragmatic factors really intrude on what is said. For further discussion, see Saul (2002).
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difference is the theoretical analysis of the conclusion: in the global interpretation, the conclusion 
consists of meanings independent of what is said (Simons, 2017a: 479–480).
Although both local and global methods can explain the pragmatic enrichment of embedded 
clauses, Simons believes that the choice is a theoretical issue rather than an empirical observation 
of whether there is evidence to make a choice. She points out that the key is the interpretation 
of reasoning itself. What resources does the interpreter need to provide for the reconstruction 
of partially enriched cases? The answer is to allow the interpreter to identify the content of the 
embedded clause. Let us turn to the complement sentence of a propositional attitude verb (there are 
changes to the original example).
(4) Where did Jane go last week?
(5) (a) Henry believes she spent the week with Frances.
(b) Henry said she spent the week with Frances.
(6) But she can’t have. I had lunch with Frances on Wednesday.
Simons (2007, 2010, 2011) has demonstrated that embedded verb clauses can be used as objects 
of pragmatic inference, and these clauses form the main part of speech content. Therefore, (6) is the 
natural response of any answer in (5), which requires that the hearer should recognize the content 
of the clause as the possible answer to the question. This shows that the speaker can respond to 
or question the content of the embedded clause independently of the full content of the sentence 
in which the clause is located (Simons, 2017a: 480–483). As long as each part of the disjunctive 
sentence can be identified as the contribution to the overall speech act and the antecedent and the 
conclusion of a conditional sentence can be distinguished, the interpreter can apply TCI to the 
interpretation of embedded pragmatic effects. Further, assuming that all the information about the 
sub-sentential constituents is available, the contents of these constituents can be used as the input of 
the Gricean operation.
In summary, Simons (2017a) clarifies why Grice’s framework can explain embedded pragmatic 
effects. It is the violation of cooperation on the global level that triggers the interpreter to infer 
what a particular embedded clause conveys. Although this is different from the starting point and 
conclusion of Grice’s TCI, the reasoning mechanism is the same. Some people may doubt that this 
is not really Gricean, but Simons believes that it is not her goal to prove that Grice is correct in 
every respect. She thinks that her analysis is consistent with the core content of Grice’s concept of 
communication (Simons, 2017a: 469). In other words, interlocutors need to think globally and act 
locally. 
3. Doubts on local pragmatics
Simons (2017a) has aroused heated discussions. Carston (2017), Recanati (2017), and Borg (2017) 
have expressed their doubts. This section will sort out the comments of three commentators on 
Simons (2017a) first, aiming at accurately describing the essence of the debate4. Furthermore, there 
4. Limited to space, Simons’ (2017b) feedback would not be discussed in this section, but in the next section, most of the views from 
Simons (2017b) and three commentators would be evaluated thoroughly.
Local pragmatics: Issues and reflection
122 Forum for Linguistic Studies (2021) Volume 3, Issue 1
are some common interests as well as their unique views.
3.1. The key lies in the distinction between what is said and what is implicated and the 
conception of what is said
Carston stresses that there is no evidence to show that Grice’s worry about the examples of 
meaning placed in the range of logical operators is a worry about the derivability of Grice’s model 
and the one about rationally reconstructing inference based on conversational maxims. Of course, 
Grice’s TCI can be applied to the unconventional content of utterance meaning5. Carston believes 
that pragmatic principles can be applied to embedded speech content as long as the aim is to 
restore the interpretation of speech as a whole, whether Grice-like or not (Carston, 2017: 521–523). 
Considering Simons’ defense of the “staunch holism”, Carston thinks that pragmatic intrusion can 
be avoided by doing so. 
(7) A: What’s making noise up in the attic?
B: I’m not sure, but if there’s a nest up there, we’re going to have a big mess to clean up. 
(8) What is said: If there’s a nest up there, we’re going to have a big mess to clean up.
What is implicated: If there’s a nest occupied by birds up there, we’re going to have a big 
mess to clean up.
Speaker B’s answer in (7) leads to the result of (8). What is said by semantics does not seem 
to be within speaker meaning, because an old or abandoned nest does not cause great confusion. 
However, the holistic explanation is still feasible because Grice’s concept of “make as if to say” 
can be used to derive conversational implicature, which constitutes speaker meaning (Simons, 
2017a: 479–481). Carston thinks Simons has confused Grice’s Group A and Group C6. Although 
the literal meaning happens to be wrong, it is only the function of a specific embedded operator, 
not the speaker’s blatant violation of quality or any other maxim. If there is no embedded structure 
to answer, the literal meaning will be implied by the implicature, thus becoming a part of speaker 
meaning. There will be no discussion about “make as if to say” or violating maxims. The immediate 
consequence is that the content of “said and meant” is essentially an idle wheel, since it belongs to 
and is expanded by what is implicated.
The trouble brought to Grice’s TCI by the examples given by Simons (2017a) lies not in the 
computability, but in how these examples can be adapted to Grice’s distinction of what is said and 
what is implicated, precisely his conception of what is said (Carston, 2017: 527–529). Carston has 
already found that Grice inserted two incompatible restrictions into the concept of what is said: 
(a) on the one hand, the pragmatic requirements implied by the speaker; (b) on the other hand, 
the semantic requirement to keep close enough to the conventional compositional meaning of the 
5. See Walker (1975: 156–157), Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015: 448) in the discussion of determining the reference of 
demonstratives and indexicals and selecting the lexical meaning of ambiguous words.
6. In fact, both (7) and “there’s a garage around the corner” belong to Group A, where there are no examples of violation of the 
maxim, or at least it is not clear which maxim has been violated. This is different from Group C, which includes “examples that 
involve exploitation, that is, a procedure by which a maxim is flouted for the purpose of getting in a conversational implicature by 
means of something of the nature of a figure of speech” (Grice, 1989: 32–33). The examples Grice gave in Group C involved a “real, 
as distinct from apparent, violation of the maxim of Relation”, which he thought were very rare. This example is B’s bland statement 
about the weather in response to A’s statement, “Mrs. X is an old bag” (Grice, 1989: 35). In this way, B openly refused to make his 
statement relevant to A’s statement. Examples like this do not appear in Simons (2017a).
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sentence (Carston, 2002, 2004; Carston and Hall, 2012). Therefore, Simons needs to further explain 
on the following questions: What is the effect of local pragmatic effects in Grice’s sense? What is 
the relationship between “make as if to say” and what is said? How does “make as if to say” inspire 
the distinction between what is said and what is implicated?
3.2. The two-stage model cannot explain indexical resolution and pragmatic modulation
Recanati points out that Grice’s TCI is a two-stage analysis: the interpreter first calculates 
the propositional content (semantic level) of utterance, and then infers what the speaker actually 
means (pragmatic level) according to the context. Therefore, conversational implicature is post-
propositional because its calculation presupposes the prior identification of what is said.
As is known, the contextual assignment of indexical is managed by language rules (for example, 
the rule that “I” refers to the speaker of the utterance where “I” occurs). However, the assignment 
of demonstrative pronouns and free variables in the context depends on the speaker’s intention, 
and the recognition of the latter is based on the assumption that the speaker abides by the principle 
of cooperation, which is an instance of Gricean pragmatic inference in a broad sense. However, 
Recanati does not regard the assignment of indexical as a two-stage model like Grice’s derived 
conversational implicature, because indexical resolution and conversational implicature have 
different positions in pragmatic inference.
In detail, indexical resolution affects truth-conditions, conversational implicature does not affect 
truth-conditions, so it is inappropriate to exclude pragmatic inference that is both pragmatically 
triggered and pre-propositional. 
(9) He is late.
The hearer does not know what is said until he determines the reference of the indexical word, 
so the fact that the speaker has already said p is not a prerequisite for reasoning. In fact, the relevant 
premise is that the speaker has already used the pronoun he in a referential way, so there must be a 
certain male in the brain, and the speaker wants to state the characteristics of the male that the verb 
phrase represents. Therefore, if the premise as input is not that the speaker has already said the fact 
of p, but some other fact, pragmatically triggered inference can similarly affect truth-conditions. For 
example, when the speaker uses an expression, its literal meaning produces a verbal interpretation 
that conflicts with the speaker’s assumption of observing the principle of cooperation.
(10) There is a lion in the middle of the piazza.
The example can mean that there is a lion statue in the middle of the piazza. The premise of 
the sentence as input is not the fact of saying the sentence, because its literal meaning conflicts 
with the assumption that the speaker abides by the principle of cooperation. The interpretation of 
the lion’s pragmatic modulation can affect intuitive truth-conditions (Recanati, 2004). Therefore, 
Recanati provides a pragmatic modulation analysis that reverses the order specified by the two-stage 
model: he advocates a local reasoning process that contributes to the determination of content by 
modulating the compositional meaning of the sentence, rather than an overall reasoning process that 
occurs based on the determination of the compositional content. He argues that due to the locality 
of pragmatic inference, absurd propositions in the literal expression of a sentence do not need to be 
worked out in the interpretation of speech (Recanati, 1993: 263–266). In actual processing, even if 
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the literal proposition does not need to be calculated, its role in the rational reconstruction is still 
admitted. All in all, that pragmatic effects generated by pragmatic modulation can be embedded 
proves that they are local and pre-propositional, which shows that the two-stage model explaining 
post-propositional effects cannot be applied to indexical resolution and pragmatic modulation 
(Recanati, 2017: 494–499).
3.3. Is the rational reconstruction really sound?
To some degree, what Simons (2017a) advocates in her local pragmatics is a rational 
reconstruction of the mechanism in communication between the speaker and the hearer. Although 
there is a divergence from Grice’s TCI, local pragmatics is Gricean in a broad sense. However, the 
project that seems to be theoretically plausible has not gained much support from practice, and Borg 
(2017) and Carston (2017) respectively exhibit their concerns.
Borg (2017) does not deny Simons’ contribution, while she maintains that local pragmatics lacks 
for cognitive reality. There is no doubt that explaining the actual process of restoring language 
meaning by modeling both sides of communication is very attractive. Besides, Borg (2017: 510–
511) discusses the role of the speaker’s intention in rational reconstruction, and she believes that the 
speaker may usually have vague and uncertain intentions, so successful communication might only 
be a matter of degree. 
In comparison, Carston attempts to replace the rational reconstruction with a relevance-based 
process. She (2017: 534–536) seeks a more cognitively experienced process of interpretation. 
She thinks that Relevance Theory is based on the general view of human cognition, i.e., cognitive 
systems tend to maximize cognitive effects derived from input information and at the same time 
make the least effort possible. Therefore, speech interpretation is not a rational reconstruction of 
inference, but is related to the hearer’s actual inference process and how cognitive factors limit these 
interpretations.
(11) A: What’s making noise up in the attic? 
B: Oh, there’s a nest up there. 
Assuming that the hearer has the best-related expectation, A can expect B to provide an 
answer to her question. However, B’s answer is indirect. She implies that birds make noise in the 
attic. Linguistic decoding provides the atomic concept NEST that is associated with a series of 
encyclopedic knowledge about the nest, whose accessibility is regarded as the context premise. 
Together with the decoded propositional content, implicature can be inferred. Therefore, there is a 
“backwards inference” from relevance-based speculation to the expressed proposition that affects 
this enrichment. This is an example of a general pragmatic mechanism in which the explicitness of 
the speech hypothesis and the meaning of the hypothesis are adjusted in parallel with each other. 
The process does not stop until the reasonable inference satisfying the hearer’s expectation of 
relevance is reached.
4. Reflection on the debate: Local pragmatics and beyond
Generally, the framework put forward by Simons has gained much praise for her demonstrating 
the rationality of using the Gricean model to explain embedded pragmatic effects. Of course, it 
Huang
125Forum for Linguistic Studies (2021) Volume 3, Issue 1
remains to be a question of whether the approach could be widely accepted. The three commentators 
have expressed their own opinions, and Simons (2017b) also replies positively, promoting in-depth 
thinking on the issue. This section intends to further clarify and discuss some of the viewpoints 
in the article in an attempt to understand the essence and value of this debate more accurately and 
deeply. It is known that the debate between semantics and pragmatics, which is now more often 
conceived as that between semantic minimalism and contextualism, has lasted for over 60 years, and 
there is still no way out. Thus, when local pragmatics is involved in the debate, how does it inspire 
the current debate?
First, a new conception, i.e., what is expressed, appears in local pragmatics. At present, the 
source of the dispute between semantic minimalism and contextualism is the distinction between 
what is said and what is implicated. Simons believes that if the weak concept of what is said is 
admitted, what is said needs not be psychologically real, and what is said at this time can usually be 
downgraded to “make as if to say” (Simons, 2017a: 481), which later becomes what is expressed 
(Simons, 2017b: 543). In this way, what is expressed is not what the speaker must promise, and this 
is the development of standard Grice’s model. Meantime, it also raises a problem. Such treatment is 
equivalent to abandoning the quality maxim in the traditional framework, which is bound to result 
in disputes. Therefore, Simons’ approach still needs further verification. In addition to the concept 
of what is said, Simons modifies the maxim of quantity and claims that the maxim of relation could 
also be modified (Simons, 2017a: 488–489). It can be predicted that Simons may reshape Grice’s 
model on the basis of revising various maxims. It is precisely because Grice does not discuss the 
origin of the maxims or the relationship between maxims that scholars can make a big fuss here. 
On the other hand, if Grice has made clear the maxims, what is said, what is implicated, and other 
issues, perhaps the current theoretical research in pragmatics would not have been so lively.
Second, Carston’s focus on the role of what is said and its relationship with what is implicated 
is of great value. The trouble brought about by Simons (2017a) to Grice’s framework lies in how 
it can be adapted to the distinction between what is said and what is implicated, specifically his 
concept of what is said (Carston, 2017: 527–529). Simons’ (2017b) strategy is to modify the starting 
point of Grice’s reasoning to what is expressed so as to maintain the explanatory power of the Grice 
framework in a broad sense. The proposition expressed is not only encoded by the uttered sentence, 
but also includes the determination of the object to which the indicative component refers and the 
contextual assignment of temporal words. Besides, what is expressed is a proposition that is closely 
related to the conventional meaning of the uttered sentence and is truth-evaluative (Simons, 2017b: 
545–546). However, Simons (2017b) does not further explore the relationship between what is 
expressed and what is said, and the influence of what is expressed on the traditional distinction 
between what is said and what is implicated. The article is going to explain this.
In Grice’s model, what is said precedes what is implicated, but what is said does not precede any 
Gricean reasoning (Simons, 2017a: 486). This explains that the determination of what the speaker 
has said “is only the output of pragmatic inference, not the input” (Simons, 2017b: 544). It is worth 
attention that Simons (2017a) does not give a clear explanation of what is said. And she explains: “I 
am not committed to a Gricean view of what is said…Gricean pragmatics can get along…without 
reliance on this notion (i.e., what is said)” (Simons, 2017b: 541).
Though Simmons is not satisfied with Grice’s what is said, she does not clearly state that she 
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totally rejects the concept of what is said. Given the current debate, both semantic minimalism 
and contextualism define the concept of what is said. In order to present their different views more 
vividly, we try to arrange a place for what is said in Simons’ framework. Based on her discussion, 
we can infer that from the encoded content, the pronominal elements and tense markers are 
determined through context, and what is expressed is obtained through composition. From what is 
expressed to what is said, there may be ellipsis unpacking or generality narrowing. Then, starting 
from what is said, we can infer what is implicated in combination with contextual information7.
It should be noted that Simons argues that there is no conceptual difference between the 
pragmatic reasoning in indexical resolution and that in inferring implicature from propositional 
content (Simons, 2017b: 548). This article holds that there is also no conceptual difference between 
the pragmatic reasoning from what is expressed to what is said and that from what is said to what 
is implicated. These two processes have different starting points for pragmatic reasoning, but the 
underlying assumption is that the cooperative principle is observed. Therefore, although Simons 
(2017a, 2017b) does not clearly explain the relationship between what is expressed and what is said, 
our interpretation of Simons’ views is consistent with her theory.
(12) a. I have had breakfast. 
b. I have had breakfast this morning.
c. I don’t want to eat anything more.
For semantic minimalists, these three sentences are what is said, explicature8, what is implicated; 
for relevance theorists, they are what is said, explicature, what is implicated; for Simons, they are 
what is expressed, what is said, and what is implicated.
Simons’ model is also divided into three parts, with the difference that relevance theory adds 
a level (explicature) between what is said and what is implicated, while Simons adds what is 
expressed before what is said. At the same time, relevance theory holds that what is said contains 
pragmatic factors, but Simons’ concept of what is expressed is not committed to pragmatics. 
Therefore, Simons’ model cannot be regarded as a copy of the relevance theory. It is not a model 
with different terms but essentially the same. Besides, although the reason why Simons adopts what 
is expressed instead of what is said is to evade the speaker’s commitment, she also stipulates that 
what is expressed should not contain pragmatic elements. It seems that Simons’ what is expressed 
can be equated with Borg’s what is said. Compared with Borg’s framework, Simons’ is more 
specific and precise in explaining examples. In this sense, we can think of Simons’ framework as a 
further development of Borg’s.
Third, Simons’ position in the debate between semantic minimalism and contextualism can also 
be seen from the debate on the interpretation of embedded pragmatic effects. Carston (2017) adopts 
a lexical pragmatic approach to explain embedded pragmatic effects, forcing Simons (2017b) to 
7. Following this, the Grice’s circle proposed by Levinson (2000: 186) can be eliminated by Simons’ framework. Due to space 
constraints, we will not go into details here.
8. Borg (2016) believes that the formal and functional definitions of the concept of explicature are flawed, and she believes that 
explicature does not need psychological reality in the process of processing. In addition, the theoretical purport of semantic 
minimalism is to minimize the influence of pragmatic factors on literal meaning, so semantic minimalists would not accept the 
concept of explicature. Here, “explicature” is used neutrally for convenience of discussion, and it is enough to remember that Borg is 
not in line with relevance theory.
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explore further which interpretation approach is reasonable. She thinks that the enrichment is best 
understood as local enrichment (Simons, 2017b: 555). Although Simons insists that this substantial 
content is partial, it is not truth-conditional and is not part of what is said (Simons, 2017b: 557). 
For Carston, being local is being literal, and local pragmatic effects must be truth-conditional. Borg 
(2017a: 512) points out that “The local view, then, is a variety of Contextualist”. As is known, 
semantic minimalists try to strictly distinguish the propositional meaning of a sentence from speaker 
meaning. Borg thinks that this may be possible, but at the same time, we need to accept the local 
view that pragmatics includes more than Gricean pragmatics (Simons, 2017b: 513). Their views on 
embedded pragmatic effects could be illustrated as follows.
Table 1. Different views on embedded pragmatic effects
Carston Borg Simons
Embedded pragmatic effects are local? Yes No Yes
Embedded pragmatic effects are literal? Yes No No
Embedded pragmatic effects are truth-conditional? Yes No No
Embedded pragmatic effects are parts of what is said? Yes No No
In Table 1, it can be seen that Simons seems to bend with the wind. On the one hand, Simons 
accepts local interpretation; on the other hand, she does not regard it as literal content. Her 
viewpoint is a mix of semantic minimalism and contextualism. The source of the debate between the 
two camps lies in the different answers to what is said. The core concern of semantic minimalism is 
to minimize the influence of pragmatic factors on semantic contents and try to limit the difference 
between the conventional meaning and what is said of sentences to a minimum. And Simons makes 
it clear that the starting point of Grice’s reasoning should be what is expressed without pragmatic 
commitment (Simons, 2017a: 466; Simons, 2017b: 539). Although Simons disagree with the view 
that what is said is the starting point of reasoning, the use of what is expressed without pragmatic 
commitment precisely indicates her inclination towards semantic minimalism9. 
Meantime, Simons believes that as long as local pragmatic effects enrich a complete proposition, 
local pragmatic effects do not need to be regarded as part of the truth-conditional content. Therefore, 
in order to maintain the position, it is crucial to identify the complete proposition first. However, 
the problem lies in the completeness of proposition itself is a highly controversial topic: semantic 
minimalists insist on propositionalism, that is, the semantic content of a sentence is the minimal 
proposition determined by the lexical meaning with syntactic rules, while contextualists advocate 
that linguistic meaning is not fully determinative in language communication activities, and they 
propose unarticulated constituents to illustrate the incompleteness of semantic minimalism. Simons 
points out that what is expressed is a proposition that is closely related to the conventional meaning 
of the sentence (Simons, 2017b: 546). This confirms her preference for semantic minimalism from 
another aspect.
Fourth, it is necessary to discuss the mechanism of language communication. Simons (2017a, 
2017b) states: the purpose of linguistic interpretation is to identify the speaker’s intention. Borg 
suggests “an account which seeks to model how interlocutors actually do recover linguistic 
9. Also, there is another evidence to show that Simons is inclined to semantic minimalism. She says that “If we take that intuitively 
correct interpretation to count as ‘what is said’ (a loaded and difficult term about which there is much controversy) …(that) appear 
problematic not only for Grice’s model of pragmatic inference, but also, according to many theorists, for his notion of ‘what is said’” 
(2017a: 479).
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meaning” (Borg, 2017a: 510), and Carston would like to “move beyond normative rational 
reconstructions of the logic of speaker-hearer interactions, towards a more empirically cognitively 
based account of communication and the processes of pragmatic interpretation” (Carston, 2017: 
519). We think that these two opinions are worthy of attention, but we intend to make a preliminary 
explanation of the issues they have discussed in a broader perspective.
In fact, it is almost impossible to achieve fidelity transmission of meaning from the speaker to 
the hearer in daily communication unless the speaker clearly clarifies the compositional meaning 
of sentences before speaking. Concept is the basis of word meaning, so the discussion of meaning 
cannot be separated from the consideration of concept. Psychologists have pointed out that words 
can activate the matching concepts, and this connection is not a single linear connection but a 
selective connection of overall activation. A word can activate a conceptual network, with cultural 
specificity, individual specificity, and temporal and spatial dynamics. Then, the concept inspired 
by the same word for different individuals is likely to vary, but at a basic level, the word must 
have a public and shareable concept; otherwise, the words used by both parties in communication 
will become their private language, the speaker and the hearer will speak for themselves, and it 
is impossible to communicate successfully. Following this, natural questions emerge: what is this 
public and shareable concept? What is the relationship between the public concept and the overall 
concept of words? What contribution does the public concept make to successful communication? 
These questions are not trivial, yet they are still in hot dispute. Looking at the criticism of 
Simons’ (2017a) approach of interpretation from Borg (2017) and Carston (2017), they focus on 
the superficial phenomenon of linguistic interpretation, namely, the description of experience and 
meaning, ignoring the conceptual dimension hidden behind, which provides a starting point for 
further research. Of course, this article only preliminarily discusses the relationship between concept 
and communication, among which the complicated relationship needs in-depth study.
5. Conclusion
Simons (2017a, 2017b) demonstrates the rationality of adopting the Gricean model to explain 
embedded/local pragmatic effects. She believes that this results from a global (speech level) 
pragmatic requirement and is the measure taken by local actions to solve potential pragmatic 
violations. Her framework has triggered heated discussions among Borg (2017), Recanati (2017), 
and Carston (2017), and prompts Simons (2017b) to further clarify her position.
The debate revolves around the issue of the existence or abolition of the concept of what is said, 
the explanatory power of Grice’s two-stage model, the approach of analyzing embedded pragmatic 
effects, and the mechanism of linguistic communication, which deepen our understanding of 
relevant issues. The article has discussed several of these arguments in depth, aiming to add some 
new thoughts on the basis of accurately grasping the essence of this debate.  
Future research work can be carried out around the following aspects: first, research methods 
can be enriched. The academia is in a heated debate on what is said and what is implicated, and 
semantics and pragmatics, may not be solved by theoretical reasoning alone. Therefore, researchers 
can learn from the research methods of the experimental philosophy of language and understand the 
aforementioned classic topics from the empirical aspect (Noveck, 2018). Second, research contents 
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can be broadened. Almost all the examples that Simons (2017a, 2017b) offers are based on the 
relevance implicature, so can embedded pragmatic effects based on other maxims be explained in 
the same way? In particular, there is a great deal of controversy about the explanation of embedded 
scalar effects (Geurts, 2010; Chierchia, 2017). Can Simons’ framework be successfully applied? 
This is worth further exploration. 
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